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I.  Introduction 
Since the Asian crises which began in Thailand in summer of 1997, issues of 
corporate governance and corporate organisation in emerging markets have 
acquired an international dimension.  They constitute an important part of the 
reform agenda of G-7 countries in their plans to institute a new international 
financial architecture which would forestall future crises.  The central G-7 
argument is that the proposed reforms of the corporate and financial systems of 
developing countries are essential to make the global markets function properly. 
The implicit suggestion is that the recent financial crises in these countries were 
not the outcome of market failures but rather the failure of developing country 
governments and institutions which did not provide accurate and adequate 
information to markets, as well as imposed other distortions on the latter. This 
thesis is not universally accepted by economists, but nonetheless, such reforms 
were pressed on the crisis-affected Asian countries as part of IMF conditionality 
and are now being advocated for other developing countries.  
 
This paper1 concentrates on the reform of corporate systems in emerging 
markets, an issue which has not received as much public and academic attention 
as the reform of the financial sector in these countries. The reform of the non-
financial corporate sector necessarily involves issues of corporate governance 
and organisation including the role of the big business groups. The latter, as we 
shall see, are ubiquitous in emerging countries. 
 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section II provides the essential background 
to G-7 proposals on corporate governance which have their origins in the 
perceived structural weaknesses of the Asian economies on the eve of the crisis.  
Section III  sets out the main proposals which are currently the subject of 
attention. Section IV provides information on the systems of corporate 
governance which prevail in developing countries and how they differ from 
those in advanced economies.  Section V considers the contributions of the 
recent research on Law and Finance in relation to the appropriate model of 
corporate governance for the emerging countries. Sections VI and VII consider 
the financing of corporate growth in emerging markets and how it affects 
corporate governance.  Section VIII addresses one of the key areas of 
controversy: the efficiency and viability of large conglomerate organisations in 
developing countries. Section IX concludes and draws implications for 
economic policy. 
 
This paper contributes in the following ways. It brings together relevant 
empirical and theoretical analysis from diverse fields – the theory of the firm, 
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the theory of corporate finance, the theory of economic development – to bear 
on the issues under discussion. It also contributes by providing a critical 
analysis of the conventional wisdom and by outlining alternative perspectives 
on these issues which maybe useful to developing countries in their discussions 
with international financial institutions.  Thirdly the paper contributes by 
furnishing new information on the financing of corporate growth in the 1990s 
and by documenting empirical anomalies in the financing patterns of both 
emerging and mature markets. Contrary to a priori expectations the paper 
indicates the important role of the stock market in financing corporate growth in 
emerging markets. It explores the relationship between corporate finance, 
corporate governance and stock market development. Lastly, the paper 
examines the implications of the analyses for the efficiency and reform of the 
third world conglomerates. In that context particular attention is given to the 
case of Korean big-business groups and the government reform programmes for 
these corporations in the wake of the financial crisis. 
 
 
II.  The Asian financial crisis and corporate governance 
The impetus behind the quest for a new international financial architecture came 
from the crisis which erupted in Thailand in July 1997 and quickly spread to 
other Asian economies. Whereas previous crises had struck economies with a 
history of financial instability and low growth, such as Mexico in 1995, the 
Asian crisis devastated countries that were the fastest growing in the world 
economy and had solid achievements in technological upgrading and poverty 
reduction.  The international financial institutions and private commercial and 
investment banks had frequently cited them as prime examples of the benefits of 
export-led growth and the “market-friendly” approach to development. The 
shock among policymakers and market participants was therefore acute.   
 
After the initial shock of the crisis had worn off, however, an influential theory 
of the crisis emerged that argued that the deeper reasons for it could be found in 
the institutional structures of the Asian model. This view was succinctly 
conveyed by Larry Summers, then the US Treasury Under Secretary, who 
argued that the roots of the Asian financial crisis did not lie in bad policy 
management but in the nature of the economies themselves. Summers stated 
that “[this crisis] is profoundly different because it has roots not in 
improvidence but in economic structures.  The problems that must be fixed are 
much more microeconomic than macroeconomic, and involve the private sector 
more and the public sector less (Financial Times, 20 February, 1998).”  This 
view was echoed in slightly different terms by the Chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve, Alan Greenspan (1998).  
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This “structuralist” interpretation of the Asian crisis was highly influential in 
the design of the policy response of the International Monetary Fund. As a 
consequence, the IMF conditioned its emergency loans on deep structural 
reforms that went far beyond the usual stabilisation measures, encompassing 
fundamental changes in labour regulations, corporate governance and the 
relationship between government and business. The scope of the IMF’s 
conditionality prompted the conservative economist Martin Feldstein to argue 
that the IMF “should not use the opportunity to impose other economic changes 
that, however helpful they may be, are not necessary to deal with the balance of 
payments problem and are the proper responsibility of the country’s own 
political system (Feldstein, 1998).” 
 
In spite of such concerns, the “structuralist” interpretation has continued to 
underpin policy proposals and framed the academic debate on the issue.  This 
view consists of several interlinked arguments. First, fragile financial systems 
resulted from relationship banking, weak corporate governance structures and 
lack of competition. Johnson et al. (2000) argue that measures of corporate 
governance and in particular the effectiveness of protection for minority 
shareholders, explain the extent of the exchange rate depreciation and stock 
market decline better than standard macroeconomic measures.  Furthermore, the 
crony-istic relations between financial institutions, business and the government 
shielded the system from market discipline and encouraged the over-investment 
that led to the crisis. Second, and related to the first point, the high leverage 
ratios of Asian firms heightened their vulnerability and created the conditions 
that led to a sudden crisis. Thirdly, the lack of transparency and the poor quality 
of information in such an insider-dominated system led to informational 
asymmetries that exacerbated the crisis. Markets did not have adequate 
information about the true financial status of the corporations and the banks.  
Thus, once the market began to assess the true facts, there was a collapse of 
confidence, see Camdessus (1998).   
 
To remedy these alleged faults in the Asian system, reformers sought to 
dissolve the close links between the state and business, create an arm’s length 
relationship between banks and business and to promote greater transparency in 
economic relations. 
 
The “structuralist” interpretation is not, however, the only account of the Asian 
crisis, nor the most persuasive. Singh and Weisse, (1999) have argued that the 
“structuralist” interpretation is not credible for several reasons.  First, it does not 
explain the previous exemplary success of the Asian economies. As Paul 
Krugman has remarked: “But if the system was so flawed, why did it work so 
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well for so long, then fail so suddenly?” (Krugman, 1999).  Second, it does not 
explain why countries such as China and, especially, India, with similar systems 
did not have a crisis.   
 
A more credible explanation of the crisis that encompasses these facts is that the 
afflicted economies dismantled their controls over the borrowing of the private 
sector and embraced financial liberalisation. As a consequence, the private 
sector built up short-term foreign currency debt that often found its way into the 
non-tradable sector and into speculative real estate ventures.  Accompanying 
financial liberalisation was the irrational exuberance and contagion that are 
always latent in private international financial flows. In sum, Singh and Weisse 
(1999), argue that the crisis occurred not because the Asian model has been 
flawed but precisely because it was not being followed. Thus, while Edmund 
Phelps identifies the crisis with the failure of Asian corporatism (Phelps, 1999), 
it can be argued that in reality this system underpinned the most successful 
industrialisation drive in history and dramatically reduced poverty. The system, 
however, was vulnerable to the forces unleashed by financial liberalisation.  
 
In this paper, two key elements of the Greenspan-Summers “structuralist” 
interpretation will, inter alia, be examined in detail. The first is the contention 
that there was poor corporate governance; secondly, there was crony capitalism 
and both these contributed to a disregard of profits in corporate decisions, and 
hence to over-investment and, ultimately, to the crisis.   
 
III. The New International Financial Architecture and Corporate 
Governance 
In a move towards defining a New International Financial Architecture, the G-7 
assigned the task of reforming corporate governance to the OECD and the 
World Bank. The main results so far of this initiative have been the following: 
(a) OECD Principles of Corporate Governance; 
(b) OECD/World Bank Compact on the Reform of Corporate Governance; 
(c) the Corporate Governance Forum meetings between officials and 
businessmen; 
(d) ‘self-assessment’ exercises in corporate governance carried out under the 
guidance of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.  
(e) the World Bank is organising investor surveys asking domestic and 
international investors the private sector’s response to the progress and 
credibility of reform. 
 
The five basic principles of corporate governance promoted by the 
OECD/World Bank initiative have been summarized in the World Bank’s main 
document on corporate governance, Corporate Governance: A Framework for 
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Implementation (Iskander and Chamlou, 2000).  The study points out that the 
principles have been based on tenets of “fairness, transparency, accountability 
and responsibility”.      
 
Protection of shareholder rights to share in company profits, receive 
information about the company, and influence the firm through 
shareholder meetings and voting. 
 
Equitable treatment of shareholders, especially minority and foreign 
shareholders, with full disclosure of material information and prohibition 
of abusive self-dealing and insider trading. 
 
Protection of stakeholder rights as spelled out in contracts and in labour 
and insolvency laws, in a framework that allows stakeholder 
participation in performance-enhancing mechanisms, gives stakeholders 
access to relevant company information, and allows effective redress for 
violations of stakeholder rights. 
 
Timely and accurate disclosure and transparency on all matters 
material to company performance, as essential to market-based 
monitoring of companies, and shareholders’ ability to exercise voting 
rights, with accounting according to quality standards of disclosure and 
audit, and with objective auditing by independent assessors. 
 
Diligent exercise of the board of directors’ responsibilities to guide 
corporate strategy, to manage the firms’ executive functions (such as 
compensation, business plans, and executive employment), to monitor 
managerial performance and achieve an adequate return for investors, to 
implement systems for complying with applicable laws (tax, labour, 
competition, environment), to prevent conflicts of interest and to balance 
competing demands on the company, and with some independence from 
managers to consider the interests of all stakeholders in the company, 
treat them fairly, and give them access to information. 
 
The World Bank report does go to some lengths to point out that “there is no 
one-size-fits-all blueprint for corporate governance”. However, the entire thrust 
of the report’s arguments and its definition of “best practice” structures detailed 
in the appendices to the report, belies any assertion that the it treats the different 
models of corporate governance equally.  It is indeed hard to find much daylight 
between the report’s conception of “best practice” and the Anglo-Saxon model 
of corporate governance, which leaves little doubt that it is the preferred system.   
 
 7
To sum up, there is considerable activity in international fora with respect to 
identifying best practice codes for corporate governance.  Developing countries 
know from past experience that today’s best practice often becomes tomorrow’s 
conditionality if a country has the misfortune of requiring IMF assistance.  
Advanced emerging markets in particular must, therefore, pro-actively engage 
in the proceedings of the Global Corporate Governance Forum and the Regional 
Corporate Governance Roundtables that the OECD and the World Bank have 
been jointly organizing.  
 
IV. Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: the Facts 
The analysis of corporate governance structures in developing countries has 
long been hindered by a lack of detailed information.  One silver lining in the 
Asian crisis and the focus of the international financial institutions on 
governance structures has been the assembling of a large body of evidence on 
corporate governance structures in developing countries at the World Bank.  
This has included information on the structure of share ownership and corporate 
governance laws.  Thus, we are now in a position to construct a more informed 
picture of the governance structures in a wide range of developing countries. 
 
Patterns of share ownership and control of large corporations in developed and 
emerging markets 
 
A key insight to emerge from the new empirical studies is that the widely-held 
corporation described in the classic study by Berle and Means, (1933) is an 
Anglo-Saxon phenomenon.  As Table 1 indicates, among developing countries, 
the share of family-controlled2 firms in the top 20 publicly-traded companies in 
Mexico, Hong Kong and Argentina are 100%, 70% and 65% respectively.  In 
contrast, in the U.K. the top 20 quoted companies are 100% widely-held.  
However, among developed countries there is a diversity of structures.  In 
Sweden and Portugal, 45% of the top twenty publicly-traded firms are family-
controlled, while in Greece and Belgium the figure is 50%.  Even in the United 
States the share of family-controlled, firms is 20% of the top 20 publicly traded 
firms.   
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Table 1. Control of publicly traded firms around the world, 1996 (per cent) 
      
Economy Widely 
held 
Family 
owned 
State 
owned 
Widely held 
financial 
Widely held 
corporation 
      
OECD countries       
(non-Bank borrower)      
      
Australia 65 5 5  25 
Austria 5 15 70   
Belguim 5 50 5 30  
Canada 60 25   15 
Denmark 40 35 15   
Finland 35 10 35 5 5 
France 60 20 15 5  
Germany 50 10 25 15  
Greece 10 50 30 10  
Ireland 65 10   10 
Italy 20 15 40 5 10 
Japan 90 5 5   
Netherlands 30 20 5  10 
New Zealand 30 25 25  20 
Norway 25 25 35 5  
Portugal 10 45 25 15 0 
Spain 35 15 30 10 10 
Sweden 25 45 10 15  
Switzerland 60 3  5  
UK 100     
USA 80 20    
      
Bank borrowers and others     
      
Argentina  65 15 5 15 
Hong Kong 10 70 5 5  
Israel 5 50 40  5 
Mexico  100    
Singapore 15 30 45 5 5 
Korea, Rep. of 55 20 15  5 
      
      
Source: Iskander and Chamlou 
(2001) 
    
 
In terms of state ownership and control of large firms, the picture is similarly 
complex.  In Israel and Singapore, nearly half (40% and 45%, respectively) of 
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the top 20 publicly-traded firms were state controlled.  In the major OECD 
economies, this figure ranges from zero in the US and the U.K., to 25% in 
Germany and 40% in Italy. Among the smaller advanced economies there is a 
similar range, with Austrian state-run corporations controlling a 70% share of 
the top 20 publicly-traded firms. It is therefore not surprising that Russia now 
has a higher degree of private ownership than many Western European 
countries.   
 
Table 2 provides evidence from Asian countries assembled by Claessens et al., 
(2000) which is based on a very large sample of nearly 3,000 publicly-traded 
firms in nine countries.  It indicates that when 10% equity ownership is defined 
as control, Japan is the only country with the Berle and Means-style system of 
dispersed share ownership (42% of publicly-traded firms), but with an 
additional 38.5% of firms controlled by widely-held financial institutions.  At 
the 10% level, most other countries had systems dominated by families: 
Indonesia (68.6%), Korea (67.9%), Taiwan (65.6%), Malaysia (57.5%) and 
Thailand (56.5%).   When control is defined at the 20% level, the Berle and 
Means widely-held system becomes more pronounced, as many families in 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan have family ownership of between 10% and 20% of 
the equity. However, even after redefining control, family-controlled 
corporations still account for 48.4% of publicly-traded companies in Korea and 
48.2% in Taiwan.  Moreover, in other countries the share of family-controlled 
firms (as a share of the total number of firms under ‘control’) increases with the 
redefinition of control. In Indonesia the class of family-controlled firms 
increases at the expense of state, widely-held financial and widely-held 
corporate control.  In Thailand, family control increases from 57.7% to 67.2% 
and in Malaysia from 57.7% to 67.2% with the change of definition for control. 
(Claessens et al., 2000, p.104).   
 
An interesting variant is provided by the typical pattern of share ownership and 
control in large Indian firms – the Business Groups. Available evidence 
suggests that among the top 40 firms, directors and their families held only 22.4 
per cent of shares.  Financial institutions and banks held 27.9 per cent (Singh, 
Singh & Weisse, 2003).  Since all these financial institutions were controlled by 
the government and in many of these largest corporations the government had, 
effectively, a controlling shareholding. However, traditionally, Indian financial 
institutions support the owning family unless the company performance was 
exceptionally poor. 
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Table2.  Control of publicly traded companies in East Asia
Country Number of 
corporations
Widely held Family State Widely held 
financial
Widely held 
corporation
10% cutoff
Hong Kong 330 0.6 64.7 3.7 7.1 23.9
Indonesia 178 0.6 68.6 10.2 3.8 16.8
Japan 1240 42.0 13.1 1.1 38.5 5.3
Korea 345 14.3 67.9 5.1 3.5 9.2
Malaysia 238 1.0 57.5 18.2 12.1 11.2
Philippines 120 1.7 42.1 3.6 16.8 35.9
Singapore 221 1.4 52.0 23.6 10.8 12.2
Taiwan 141 2.9 65.6 3.0 10.4 18.1
Thailand 167 2.2 56.5 7.5 12.8 21.1
20% cutoff
Hong Kong 330 7.0 66.7 1.4 5.2 19.8
Indonesia 178 5.1 71.5 8.2 2.0 13.2
Japan 1240 79.8 9.7 0.8 6.5 3.2
Korea 345 43.2 48.4 1.6 0.7 6.1
Malaysia 238 10.3 67.2 13.4 2.3 6.7
Philippines 120 19.2 44.6 2.1 7.5 26.7
Singapore 221 5.4 55.4 23.5 4.1 11.5
Taiwan 141 26.2 48.2 2.8 5.3 17.4
Thailand 167 6.6 61.6 8.0 8.6 15.3
Note: Newly assembled data for 2,980 publicly traded corporations (including both financial and 
non-financial institutions) as based on Worldscope and supplemented with information from
country-specific sources.  In all cases, Claessens et al. collected the ownership structure as of the 
end of fiscal year 1996 or the closest possible date.
Source: Claessens et al. (2000), p.103.
 
 
Crony capitalism 
Claessens et al., (2000) also present evidence (reported in Table 3) on the 
ownership concentration of family owned firms. As noted earlier, the orthodox 
argument in the wake of the Asian crisis suggested that “crony capitalism” – the 
complex of relationships between large family capitalists and their government 
allies – created the conditions for economic collapse.  However, the evidence 
indicates that there is no direct link between the share of GDP controlled by 
family firms and performance.  In Hong Kong, the top 15 families controlled 
84.2 percent of GDP in 1996 while in Singapore and Malaysia the respective 
figures were 48.3% and 76.2%.  Hong Kong and Singapore were both able to 
weather the financial crisis in Asia in 1997 while Malaysia experienced a sharp 
downturn and currency crash.  Similarly, Taiwan’s top 15 families control 17% 
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of GDP and the country avoided the financial crisis while the top 15 families in 
Korea account for 12.9% of GDP and the country experienced a sharp 
contraction and currency depreciation in late 1997 and early 1998.  A similar 
story applies when we measure the influence of the top 15 families by their 
ownership of corporate assets, although in this case the top 15 families control 
38.4% of the corporate assets in Korea compared to 20.1% in Taiwan (this, 
however, reflects the more concentrated industrial structure in Korea and the 
dominance of large firms on its stock market).   
 
It is important to note that such concentrations of economic power in a set of 
families is not necessarily antithetical to the efficient functioning, transparency 
and democratic accountability of the industrial system, as the case of the highly 
influential Wallenberg family in Sweden indicates. It is believed that the 
Wallenberg’s control up to 60% of Sweden’s industrial capital, and 
consequently, little is done in the country which does not have their approval. 
Furthermore, as Berglof and von Thadden note, crony capitalism is not a 
corporate governance problem in a strict sense since family owners are likely to 
have the right incentives in their firms (Berglof and von Thadden, 1999). Crony 
capitalism is rather a product of the complex of relations between the business 
and political elites and could in principle arise in systems with widely dispersed 
ownership.               
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Table 3.  How concentrated is family control?
Country Average number   % of total value of listed corporate assets % of GDP
of firms per family            that families control (1996) 1996
Top 1 Top 5 Top 10 Top 15 Top 15
family families families families families
Hong Kong 2.36 6.5 26.2 32.2 34.4 84.2
Indonesia 4.09 16.6 40.7 57.7 61.7 21.5
Japan 1.04 0.5 1.8 2.4 2.8 2.1
Korea 2.07 11.4 29.7 36.8 38.4 12.9
Malaysia 1.97 7.4 17.3 24.8 28.3 76.2
Philippines 2.68 17.1 42.8 52.5 55.1 46.7
Singapore 1.26 6.4 19.5 26.6 29.9 48.3
Taiwan 1.17 4.0 14.5 18.4 20.1 17.0
Thailand 1.68 9.4 32.2 46.2 53.3 39.3
Note: Newly asembled data for 2,980 publicly traded corporations (including both financial and non-financial
institutions).  The data was collected from Worldscope and supplemented with information from country-specific
sources.  In all cases, we collect the ownership structure as of the end of fiscal year 1996 or the closest possible 
date.  The "average number of firms per family" refers only to firms in the sample.  To avoid discrepancies in the cross-
country comparison due to different sample coverage, we have scaled down the control holdings of each family group
in the last four columns by assuming that the firms missing from our sample are not controlled by any of the largest
15 families.  The percent of total GDP is calculated using market capiotalization and GDP data from the World Bank.
Source: Claessens et al. (2000), p.108.
 
 
V.  The Theoretical  Foundations of the OECD/World Bank Proposals on 
Corporate Governance 
The World Bank’s preference for the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance is based on what they regard as “best practice”.   Conspicuously, it 
is not based on systematic theoretical analysis or rigorous empirical research.   
However, a recent series of papers by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Schleifer and Robert Vishny (hereafter referred to as LLSV) on 
law and finance has helped fill these theoretical and empirical lacunae.   
 
The LLSV thesis 
The central proposition of the by now fairly extensive literature generated by 
LLSV and their colleagues is that there is a systematic causal relationship 
between the legal framework, the corporate financing patterns, corporate 
behaviour and performance, and overall economic growth.3  More specifically, 
it argues that the greater the protection afforded to minority shareholders and 
creditors, the more external financing firms will be able to obtain.  Through a 
variety of mechanisms this greater access to external finance modifies corporate 
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behaviour and improves performance, which then has a positive impact on 
aggregate economic growth.   
 
The LLSV analysis is based on an empirical and theoretical evaluation of 
different legal systems whose historical origins are exogenous (or, in the case of 
LDCs, they are a legacy of colonial rule). The studies differentiate between four 
types of law systems: Anglo-Saxon “common law” (as practiced in the US and 
other former British colonies), French “civil law”, and German and 
Scandinavian legal traditions (which are in general closer to the French “civil 
law” tradition). The main analysis focuses on the differences between the 
common and civil law traditions.   
 
A distinguishing characteristic of these contributions is their strong empirical 
emphasis. The empirical results presented by LLSV indicate that the predictions 
of the legal origin model are verified by the data. Specifically, they argue that 
the lack of protection for minority shareholders, as is the case in the French civil 
law countries, leads to concentration of share ownership, a point that the data 
indicate is correct. Similarly, they suggest that other things being equal, 
corporations in common law countries pay out more dividends and have higher 
share prices than firms in civil law countries.  In addition, the evidence – in 
conformity with the theory – indicates that there has been a faster development 
of stock markets under a common law legal system than under the civil law 
system.  In point of fact, however, their claim is even more ambitious: that the 
legal system provides a better classification of countries  than the distinction 
between “bank-based” and “stock market-based” financial systems.   
 
The policy implication that LLSV draw from this analysis is that countries 
should move toward the more efficient common law system based on 
transparency and arm’s length relationships. It is argued, however, that this 
would not be easy given the vested interests connected with concentrated share 
ownership who could frustrate any government attempt to dilute their equity 
stakes. Governments are therefore advised to carry out the reforms in a much 
more indirect and subtle way that challenges the influence of the conglomerates.   
 
The Berglof and von Thadden Critique 
 
There are two significant lines of criticism that can be directed against this body 
of thought. The first, articulated by  Berglof and von Thadden, (1999) finds the 
theoretical framework presented in LLSV far too limited for examining 
corporate governance issues in developing countries. At an empirical level, they 
argue that the LLSV characterization of corporate governance in these countries 
is not only too narrow but also misleading.   
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The focus of the analysis on protecting minority shareholders and creditors is 
too narrow, Berglof and von Thadden contend, to be even applied to most 
European countries, let alone developing countries. LLSV appear to be solely 
interested in the question of the protection of providers of external finance to the 
exclusion of other significant stakeholders in the firm. In particular, there is no 
mention of labour laws or the equally vital relationships between workers and 
managers, suppliers and owners/managers, local communities and the 
corporation as well as the government and the corporation.  In effect, all these 
relationships are ignored while the promotion of external financing is placed, 
alone, in the centre of the analysis. Thus, any sense of the structures in which 
the firm is embedded and which determine its performance and competitiveness 
is expunged from consideration and we are led to place a disproportionate 
weight to one - potentially small - aspect of this structure. Berglof and von 
Thadden do not regard external finance as the only, or even the principal, 
constraint on firm growth (see, however, Section VI on this point).  
 
Berglof and von Thadden also note that the reference point for the LLSV study 
is the widely-held, Berle and Means-type corporation which is prevalent mainly 
in the United States and the United Kingdom (as was indicated by the analysis 
in section IV).  In the developing country context, they point out that the LLSV 
paradigm is valid and relevant only for the case of transitional economies, 
which is not entirely surprising given the fact that some of the LLSV authors 
were intimately involved in Russian reforms in the 1990s.  The former Russian 
state-owned sector has been dominated by owners/managers who have benefited 
from insider privatisations and who have often effectively expropriated outside 
investors who often have to play a central role in the implementation of painful 
restructuring (Berglof and von Thadden, p.24).  In this context, Berglof and von 
Thadden argue, improved investor protection can be very useful in attracting 
outside capital and forcing restructuring.   
 
The typical firm in developing countries, however, is family-controlled or 
closely-held by block holders, i.e. it has concentrated share ownership.  The 
important corporate governance problem for this class of firms is not legal 
protection for outside shareholders but rather the problems of family succession 
and maintaining family control while raising funds from outside investors.   
 
The LLSV argument is also susceptible to the fact that the direction of causality 
between legal system and financial structure could run in either direction.  The 
legal system may lead to the formation of a certain financial structure, as LLSV 
maintain, but it is at least equally plausible that the financial structure may also 
lead to the creation of legal norms. In the latter view, the law accommodates 
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larger structural changes taking place in the economy, financial markets and 
politics.  To therefore argue, as LLSV do, for the primacy of legal origins in 
financial market development is to place the cart before the horse.     
 
It is important to note that even on its own terms, maximising investor 
protection cannot be optimal.  It will result in the dilution of efficiency 
advantages deriving from the lower agency costs of concentrated ownership.  A 
system which is also more oriented towards investor protection may also lead to 
familiar problems of short-termism which often characterise firms in the Anglo-
Saxon stock market economies which result in lower levels of investment and 
an emphasis on financial engineering (Cosh, Hughes and Singh, 1990; Porter, 
1992; Singh, 2000).    
 
The Glen, Lee and Singh analysis 
The second and rather different critical line of argument against the central 
LLSV thesis has been presented by Glen, Lee and Singh (2000).  They suggest 
that over the past 20 years there have been major changes in corporate financing 
patterns and in stock market development in emerging markets.  It would be 
difficult to attribute these enormous variations, as detailed below, to changes in 
corporate law or to legal origin.  This will be illustrated by considering the 
specific experience of India, a pre-eminently common law based country.  
Despite this fact, in accordance with political decisions of the Indian leadership 
the stock market up to 1980 played hardly any role in the economy.  Stock 
market capitalisation as a proportion of GDP was a mere 5 percent until then.  
The government began a change in its economic policy stance in the early 1980s 
and began to implement financial liberalisation internally.  However, following 
the balance of payments and liquidity crisis of 1990-1991, the government 
initiated a more full-scale internal as well as external liberalisation.  The net 
result was that there was a stock market boom.  Total market capitalisation rose 
from 5% in 1980 to 13% in 1990 and to 40% in 1993.  There were two million 
mutual fund investors in India in 1980 but by 1995 there were over 40 million, 
second only to the US.  The number of companies listed on the Indian stock 
markets rose to nearly 8,000, a figure bigger than that for the US, the largest 
developed country market.  Hundreds of companies made IPOs as well as a 
large number of existing listed companies raised fresh equity finance on the 
stock market.   
 
These enormous changes in stock market development and financing of Indian 
corporations occurred in a brief space of time without any fundamental changes 
in India’s constitution or basic legal framework (see Singh, 1998a).   
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India, however, is not a special case.  Other emerging markets (for example, 
Taiwan, Mexico, Thailand and Malaysia) in the 1980s also recorded enormous 
increases in stock market activity in the wake of financial liberalisation.  Again, 
this was not a response to changes in the basic legal framework from a civil law 
to a common law regime (Singh, 1997; Singh and Weisse, 1998).  Rather it was 
the result of the deliberate change in economic policy.  Laws were changed to 
accommodate economic policy decisions without altering their fundamental 
framework.  Obviously, there will be examples of the opposite kind where the 
legal framework has led changes in economic institutions.  There is thus likely 
to be a mutually interactive relationship between laws and economic policy.  
LLSV greatly overstate their case by asserting a one-way causal relationship.   
 
The LLSV legal origin approach is thus unable to account for the huge changes 
in corporate financing patterns and stock market development within emerging 
markets over time.  So that even if we accepted that legal origin may explain 
some of the cross-sectional variations between developing countries, it is not 
helpful in explaining the much more important structural changes that have 
been taking place in emerging markets over the last two decades.   
 
Finally, the LLSV analysis also requires us to accept that countries with a civil 
law tradition and, consequently, less protection for outside investors, have been 
either willing to accept or ignorant of the economic costs of their legal system.  
If they had been rational, Germany and France would have imported a common 
law system decades ago and even experienced higher rates of growth.  In view 
of the fact that over the last century economic growth in Japan and Germany 
was faster and that of France was comparable to those in the Anglo-Saxon 
economies, such an argument strains credulity.4  
 
VI.  Corporate governance and corporate finance in emerging markets 
1990s versus 1980s 
 The last section touched on issues of corporate finance in the context of a 
critique of the LLSV approach to law and finance.  Here we shall report more 
directly on corporate financing patterns in developing countries.  As is implicit 
in the previous discussion, there is a close relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate finance.  Indeed, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define 
corporate governance in terms of the rules and procedures which ensures that 
external investors and creditors in a company can get their money back and will 
not simply be expropriated by those who are managing the company. 
 
Two of the first large-scale empirical studies of the financing of corporate 
growth in emerging markets were Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995a) 
(henceforward, both studies will be referred to as S-H).  The two studies arrived 
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at surprising conclusions.  One would have expected, a priori, that because of 
the underdevelopment and imperfections of developing country capital markets, 
firms in these countries would largely be self-financing.  However, these two 
studies produced results that were quite contrary to these expectations.  Large 
developing country firms, it was found, depended overwhelmingly on external 
rather than internal finance, and used equity financing to a surprisingly large 
degree (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4. The financing of corporate growth in ten emerging markets during the  
1980s 
 
Country Internal finance External finance
(equity) 
External finance 
LTD 
Brazil 56.4 36.0 7.7 
India 40.5 19.6 39.9 
Jordan 66.3 22.1 11.6 
Malaysia 35.6 46.6 17.8 
Mexico 24.4 66.6 9.0 
Pakistan 74.0 1.7 24.3 
Republic of 
Korea 
19.5 49.6 30.9 
Thailand  27.7 NA NA 
Turkey 15.3 65.1 19.6 
Zimbabwe 58.0 38.8 3.2 
All 38.8 39.3 20.8 
F1 20.0* 31.4* 21.2* 
F2 16.69* 18.93* 6.38* 
 
Note:  
1. F-statistic for comparison of means across countries. ‘*’ implies rejection of 
the null hypothesis of the equality of means 
2. Bartlett-Box F-statistic for variance across countries. ‘*’ implies rejection of 
the null hypothesis of equality of variance. 
 
Source: Singh 1995a. 
 
Table 4 suggests that during the 1980s the average company among the 100 
largest listed manufacturing firms in each country, in a sample of ten emerging 
markets, financed merely 40 per cent of its growth of net assets from retained 
profits. About 60 per cent of corporate growth in the sample of emerging markets 
was financed by external sources – 40 per cent from new equity capital and 20 per 
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cent from long-term debt. Even though the equity financing figures were to some 
extent overstated by virtue of the fact that an indirect method of estimation was 
used (on account of lack of direct information), these figures were much larger 
than might have been expected a priori.5 In advanced economies with well-
developed capital markets, the typical large firm is thought to follow a ‘pecking 
order’ in which most of the needed finance for growth us obtained from retained 
profits. If additional resources are required, the firm would borrow funds and only 
as a last resort would it issue new shares in the equity market. 
 
In explaining these results for emerging markets, Singh (1995a) hypothesized 
that the much greater recourse to external finance in developing country 
corporations was due to the faster growth of these firms relative to those in 
advanced countries and therefore had a greater need for external capital.  On the 
supply side, such finance was forthcoming at least for the large developing 
country firms through government-directed finance, while it was the small firms 
that faced credit rationing.  However, he explained the surprisingly high use of 
equity finance in conjunctural terms:   
 
a) the direct role of the governments in stimulating stock market 
development in many emerging countries so as to facilitate 
privatisation; 
b) external and internal financial liberalisation which often lead both to a 
stock market boom and to higher real interest rates; the former 
lowered the cost of equity capital whilst the latter increased the cost of 
debt finance. 
 
Singh suggested that once these temporary factors cease to operate, the situation 
would revert to the normal low levels of equity financing.  Most of the factors 
that lead corporations in advanced economies to avoid new share issues, such as 
asymmetric information apply, mutatis mutandis, to developing countries as 
well. In addition, the desire of wealthy families in developing countries to retain 
control over large firms also militates against the use of equity finance.  
Similarly, the greater volatility of share prices observed, as well as expected, in 
developing country stock markets should discourage the use of equity finance.  
 
Have the corporate financing patterns in emerging markets changed in the 1990s 
compared with the 1980s?  If so, have they changed in the direction indicated 
above – that is, do they suggest that the conjunctural factors have ceased to 
operate or are less applicable? Tables 5, 6a and 6b attempt to answer this 
question for four emerging markets. The tables are based on the WorldScope 
dataset for individual listed corporations for four countries, India, Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand. The dataset provides information for only the 1990s so 
 19
that a direct comparison of these results to those of Singh (1995a) and Singh 
and Hamid (1992) for the 1980s must be made carefully and with due regard to 
the intrinsic differences in the datasets. 
 
Table 5.  Balanced sample:  Sources of financing of growth of total assets, 1992-1996 
 
Unweighted averages are the average of the sum (over companies) of each source of finance 
in each year divided by the sum of the growth of total assets.  The balanced samples for the 
four countries are as follows:  India = 115; Malaysia = 130; Thailand = 98; Korea = 95. 
 
Korea*       India  Malaysia Thailand 
Retentions   23.1  25.3  13.3   5.7 
External finance   76.9  74.7  86.7  94.3 
Shares    31.2  14.6   9.6  16.1 
Debt finance   43.3  51.0  70.8  80.6 
Sources of Financing of Growth of Total Assets, 1992-1996 
(unweighted average)
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*Unweighted ratios for Korea are calculated over three years 1994-1996.  Some unusually 
large ratios for 1993 were omitted from overall average. Source:  WorldScope database.
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India (%) Malaysia (%) Thailand (%) Korea (%)
Net asset growth 37.2 32.9 39.7 20.6
Retentions 36.9 56.9 48.0 13.7
External finance 64.9 46.8 55.6 96.5
Long term debt 40.6 14.4 36.1 67.8
Shares 24.0 18.2 15.9 21.1
Other 0.3 14.2 3.6 7.6
Statistical adjustment -1.9 -3.8 -3.5 -10.2
finance were constrained to those between -100 per cent and +200 per cent (see Singh 1995, TP2).  Internal
and external finance were calculated as in Singh (1995), TP2, page 39.  Note also that external finance of net
assets by equity (new shares) was calculated directly as against the residual used in TP2.  
The statistical adjustments in the table arise from the constraints placed on the financial ratios.
India (%) Malaysia (%) Thailand (%) Korea (%)
Retentions 36.9 56.9 48.0 13.7
External finance 63.1 43.1 52.0 86.3
Long term debt 40.6 14.4 36.1 67.8
Shares 22.5 28.6 15.9 18.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note:  This table was constructed using Singh (1995), TP2 residual method. Retentions and long-term debt were
 calculated directly and new shares werethe residual sources of funds.  Source:  Worldscope database.
Table 6b: Balanced sample: Unweighted average sources of financing of growth of net assets: 1992-1996
The balance samples for the four countries are: India = 115, Malaysia = 130, Thailand = 98, Korea = 95
Table 6a: Balanced sample: Unweighted average sources of financing of growth of net assets: 1992-1996
The balance samples for the four countries are: India = 115, Malaysia = 130, Thailand = 98, Korea = 95
Note: All cases where average annual rates of growth of net assets was less than one percent were rejected 
since low values of growth (the denominator) would lead to high values for the whole ratio.  Internal and external
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Specifically, the WorldScope dataset makes it possible to measure the extent of 
equity financing directly instead of using the indirect residual method employed 
in the S-H studies because of data limitations.  The new dataset also allows us to 
undertake a more comprehensive analysis of sources of financing for corporate 
growth including both short- and long-term debt and working capital.  The S-H 
studies only examined long-term debt which in the case of developing countries, 
as subsequent events demonstrated, is not an adequate reflection of their normal 
indebtedness. This is because developing country corporations use large 
amounts of short-term debt for long-term investment purposes. Such debt is 
normally rolled over, turning it into the functional equivalent of long-term debt, 
but creditors may refuse to roll over these debts in crisis situations, as 
exemplified by the Asian crisis of 1997-1998.  Therefore, the results reported in 
Table 5 are based on a methodology that differs from that of S-H in the 
following respects: 
 
(a) By measuring the contributing of equity finance directly (as noted above, the 
WorldScope data provides that information); 
(b) By including short-term debt as well as trade credit in external sources of 
finance. The earlier studies were only concerned with long-term capital 
employed in the firm i.e. the growth of net assets.  The exercise in Table 5 
includes all sources of finance -–short term as well as long term. 
(c) By including another category for revaluation reserves, minority interests, 
preferred shares and non-equity reserves. 
 
The results in Table 5 confirm the main S-H result that developing country 
firms depend overwhelming on external finance to finance their growth.  As 
expected, the contribution of external financing is, if anything, greater than in 
the S-H studies because of the inclusion of short-term debt and working capital 
in the sources of finance.  In Korea, for example, nearly 95 per cent of the total 
sources of finance consisted of external finance; in Thailand the corresponding 
figure was 89 per cent; in Malaysia and India, it was 75 and 80 per cent 
respectively.  The contribution of short-term debt to total sources of finance is 
also striking, ranging as it does from just under 30 per cent in India to well over 
45 per cent in Korea. 
 
However, the results for the equity financing variables are more mixed.  
Although only a rough comparison can be made, the results show reduced 
equity financing in some countries in the 1990s compared with the 1980s, and 
increasing equity financing in others.  In the case of India, there is a ten 
percentage point increase in the contribution of new share issues to total sources 
of finance between the 1980s and 1990s. In Malaysia and Korea the proportions 
contributed by new share issues is smaller than in the S-H studies.  
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Nevertheless, in both countries, the contributions of new share capital is more 
than 15 per cent which, contrary to the pecking order theory is greater than the 
share of retained profits (it is of course well above the figure attributed to new 
share issues in advanced economies (Mayer, 1990; Corbett and Jenkinson, 
1997). 
 
The question remains whether the above results can be attributed entirely to the 
biased measurement of the equity financing variable in the benchmark S-H 
studies for the 1980s.  To investigate this, both the Singh and Hamid residual 
method and the direct method were used to calculate the financing of net assets 
(i.e., the long-term capital employed in the firm) in a sample of four countries 
over the 1992-1996 period.  The results reported in Tables 6a and 6b show that 
the direct method and the S-H residual method produce broadly similar results.  
For both India and Korea, the residual method slightly underestimated the 
contribution of equity finance while in the case of Malaysia it significantly 
overestimated its contribution.  In the case of Thailand, both methods arrived at 
identical results.  This analysis therefore suggests that in three out of four 
countries, the S-H method did not overstate the contribution of equity finance.  
Thus, in the case of these countries, the observed changes in the corporate 
financing patterns from the 1980s to the 1990s are likely to reflect the 
substantive factors discussed earlier rather than measurement bias.  
 
 
Corporate finance, the stock market and corporate governance 
In view of the large recourse to equity financing by developing country firms 
during the 1980s and much of the 1990s, the stock markets might be expected to 
significantly affect their behaviour and their corporate governance patterns. It is 
therefore important to ask how this pattern of corporate finance affects 
corporate governance. The stock market can affect corporate governance and 
behaviour either directly through movements in share prices, or, more 
indirectly, through the market for corporate control.  We examine each of these 
in turn below.  
 
It is clear from the pattern of finance that stock markets may be expected to 
have a significant influence on large developing country corporations because 
of the scale of finance they obtain from these markets. Whether or not this is 
positive or negative development depends to a large extent on the position one 
takes with regard to the ability of the stock market to efficiently finance 
corporations.  In traditional textbook treatments of the subject, the liquid 
secondary equity market results in a better allocation of funds that results in 
more efficient and dynamic firms obtaining capital at lower cost.  Similarly, less 
efficient firms or firms in less dynamic industries face a higher cost of equity 
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capital.  The result is the movement of funds to more efficient, productive firms 
that results in higher degrees of technological progress and economic growth.  
 
However, a more critical literature originating in the work of John Maynard 
Keynes has pointed out that the pricing process may not be as efficient as the 
textbooks suggest, but may instead be dominated by speculation.  James 
Tobin(1984) has distinguished two concepts of share price efficiency on the 
stock market: informational efficiency (in the sense that all currently available 
information is incorporated into the share price) and fundamental valuation 
efficiency (share prices must accurately reflect the future discounted earnings of 
the corporation).  While real world stock market prices may reflect the former, 
the critical school maintains that there are strong reasons to doubt that it attains 
the latter, more important, criterion of efficiency. The reasons for this are found 
in the psychology of stock market participants.6  As Keynes pointed out in his 
famous description of the beauty contest in the General Theory, often the art of 
the successful investor does not consist in appreciating fundamental values of 
corporations, but rather in guessing at the likely movements of other stock 
market participants.  Such a process leads to herding, myopia and fads that can 
lead stock market values to diverge significantly from underlying values (for a 
current example, note the rise and fall of technology shares on international 
stock markets). The volatility associated with this process further reduces the 
capacity of share prices to transmit efficient signals to market participants.   
 
Experience from advanced countries suggests that the stock market may also 
encourage managers to pursue short-term profits at the expense of long-term 
investment since firms are obliged to meet quarterly or half-yearly earnings per 
share targets determined by market expectations. Any serious fall in 
performance will quickly be reflected in a lower share price making the firm 
vulnerable to takeover.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, numerous analysts in 
the United States ascribed that country’s relatively poor comparative 
performance vis-à-vis competitors with bank-based financial systems such as 
Japan and Germany to the short-termist demands of Wall Street resulting in 
lower investment in technological upgrading and new capacity.7  In a closely 
related but more general sense, the dominance of stock markets can also result 
in the ascendancy of finance over productive enterprise.  The rules of the game 
are constructed in such a way that companies can rise or fall depending on their 
ability to engage in financial engineering rather than in developing new 
products or processes. This is often reflected within the firm itself in the 
dominance of managers trained in finance over those who come from other 
backgrounds such as engineering or marketing.   
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Thus, the benefits of having large corporations dependent on a highly liquid 
equity market are far from being unambiguous, particularly from the perspective 
of good corporate governance (see further Bhinde, 1994). 
 
Corporate governance and takeovers 
The market for corporate control is thought to be the evolutionary endpoint of 
stock market development.  The ability of an outside group of investors to 
acquire a corporation, often through a hostile bid, is the hallmark of the stock 
market dominated US and U.K. financial systems. As noted above, the textbook 
interpretation of takeovers is that they improve efficiency by transferring 
corporate assets to those who can manage them more productively.  
Consequently, more effective managers emerge who can raise the firm’s 
profitability and share price.  Even if current managers are not replaced, an 
active market for corporate control presents a credible threat that inefficient 
managers will be replaced and thus ensures that the incumbent management 
actively seeks to maximize shareholder value and thereby raises corporate 
performance.  Even if quoted firms were not directly susceptible to changes in 
share prices because they finance themselves almost exclusively from internal 
finance (as the pecking order theory implies and empirical evidence on 
developed country corporations confirms), the market for corporate control can 
still discipline managers.  Furthermore, even if all firms are on the efficiency 
frontier, the amalgamation of some through the act of takeovers may lead to a 
better social allocation of resources via synergy.  
 
However, a critical school has developed a multifaceted critique that has 
increasingly questioned the above textbook version of the market for corporate 
control.  First, a number of analysts in the critical school have pointed out that 
in the real world the market for corporate control, even in advanced economies, 
has an inherent flaw in its operation: it is far easier for a large firm to take over 
a small one than the other way around (Singh, 1971, 1975, 1992).  In principle, 
it is possible that a small efficient firm may take over a larger and less efficient 
company (and to a degree this occurred in the US takeover wave of the 1980s 
through “junk bonds”), its incidence is very small (Hughes, 1989).      
 
This consideration is particularly important for developing countries like India 
where there are large, potentially predatory conglomerate groups (Singh, 
1995a).  These could take over smaller, more efficient firms and thereby reduce 
potential competition to the detriment of the real economy.  In a takeover battle 
it is the absolute firepower (absolute size) that counts rather than the relative 
efficiency.  Therefore, the development of an active market for corporate 
control may encourage managers to “empire-build” not only to increase their 
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monopoly power but also to progressively shield themselves from takeover by 
becoming larger (see further Singh, 1975, 1992). 
 
Secondly, the efficient operation of the takeover mechanism requires that 
enormous amounts of information are widely available.  Specifically, market 
participants require information on the profitability of corporations under their 
existing management and what its prospective profitability would be under an 
alternative management if it were taken over.  It has been noted that such 
information is not easily available even in advanced countries and this 
informational deficit is likely to be greater in developing countries.   
 
Thirdly, takeovers are a very expensive way of changing management (Peacock 
and Bannock, 1991).  There are huge transactions costs associated with 
takeovers in countries like the US and UK which hinder the efficiency of the 
takeover mechanism.  Given the lower income levels in the developing 
countries, these costs are likely to be proportionally heavier in these countries.  
It should also be borne in mind that highly successful countries such as Japan, 
Germany and France have not had an active market for corporate control and 
have thus avoided these costs, while still maintaining systems for disciplining 
managers.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that corporate governance 
necessarily improves after takeovers.  This is for the simple reason that all 
takeovers are not disciplinary; in many of them the acquiring firm is motivated 
by empire-building considerations or even by asset-stripping. 
 
Fourthly, there is theoretical work (see for example Stein, 1989) which suggests 
that even if managers wish to maximise shareholder wealth, it would pay them 
to be myopic in a world of takeovers and signal-jamming.  Thus, takeovers 
could exacerbate the already present tendencies towards short-termism in a 
stock market-based system. 
 
Fifthly, it has been argued that takeovers can be used as a device to avoid 
honouring implicit contracts developed between workers and the former 
management (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).  This abandonment of implicit 
contracts can be argued to be socially harmful in that it discourages the 
accumulation of firm-specific human capital by workers.  The absence of strong 
worker-protection laws in many developing countries means that such 
considerations may be significant. 
 
These critiques of the market for corporate control have been based on the 
experience of advanced countries.  There is every reason to believe, however, 
that they are likely to be even more relevant to potential takeover markets in 
developing countries.  However, the takeover market in developing countries 
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remains rudimentary because of the fact, noted earlier, that shareholding is not 
widely dispersed and standards of disclosure are not conducive to takeovers.  It 
is therefore not surprising that hostile takeovers are rare in developing 
countries: e.g. in the last decade in India there have only been five or six such 
takeover attempts, not all of which were successful.  This situation may change 
if large international MNCs are allowed to engage in takeovers in developing 
countries.  Domestic firms, with their limited funds and relatively restricted 
access to international capital markets, would not be able to either compete or 
resist the MNCs.   
 
There are also other potential factors that could lead financial liberalisation and 
stock markets to have a negative effect on corporate governance.  Financial 
liberalisation establishes a strong link between two potentially volatile markets, 
the stock market and the foreign exchange market.  The Asian crisis of 1997-
1998 demonstrated that there could be a strong negative feedback relationship 
between a falling stock market and a depreciating currency.  As the stock 
market declines, investors pull out of the market and move their funds into 
foreign currency to .  The depreciating currency, in turn, lowers real returns on 
the stock market which in turn propels the cycle.8  Such a collapse in currency 
and equity values of course, ultimately may encourage “fire-sale-type FDI” in 
the form of takeovers, (suggesting that the expected rate of return measured in 
foreign currency has increased sufficiently due to the steep decline in domestic 
share prices).  This may overturn quite successful corporate governance 
structures and replace them with ones that are less suited.        
 
Developing Country Corporations and High Gearing 
It has been frequently observed that companies in developing countries are 
highly geared by international standards.  This observation is dependent on what 
definition of gearing is used.  If the ratio of long-term debt to equity is used, 
developing country indebtedness ratios are not high.  However, if the more 
encompassing ratio of total debt to total equity is used, the gearing of 
developing country corporations is high (see Table 7).  This reflects the 
extensive use of more easily available short-term debt by many developing 
country corporations to finance their often rapid growth.  In the wake of the 
Asian crisis and the evidence that the large amount of short-term debt 
contracted by conglomerates - particularly in Korea, but also in the other 
affected economies - had increased the vulnerability of these countries to a 
reversal of capital flows, the international financial institutions and governments 
have been calling for a reduction in gearing ratios.  It should be remembered, 
however, that it is possible, a priori, to use high gearing ratios to improve 
performance (by creating an optimal contract that bridges the agency problem 
between owners and managers) and also serves to enable the creation of 
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conglomerates in the first place.  This is important since, as will be discussed in 
the next section, large conglomerates are instrumentally effective in late 
developing countries.   
 
Table 7.  Capital Structure of Firms in Selected Countries, 1980-1991
Debt Ratio Long-term debt to total 
equity
Short-term debt to total 
equity
Developing Countries
Brazil 0.560 0.139 0.421
India 2.700 0.763 1.937
Korea 3.662 1.057 2.390
Malaysia 0.935 0.284 0.639
Mexico 0.817 0.375 0.442
Thailand 2.215 0.518 1.769
Developed Countries
France 3.613 1.417 2.108
Germany 2.732 1.479 1.188
Italy 3.068 1.114 1.954
Japan 3.688 0.938 2.726
United Kingdom 1.480 1.065 1.065
United States 1.791 1.054 0.679
Source: Demirguc-Kunt, A. and V. Maksimovic. 1996. "Stock Market
Development and Firm Financing Choices", The World Bank Economic 
Review, vol.10. no.2, p.354.
 
 
The key question at the heart of this issue is what defines the optimal degree of 
gearing.  In theoretical terms this is not difficult – the optimal gearing ratio is 
the one that maximises shareholder value.  Empirically, however, this is very 
difficult to determine. 
 
It has also been argued that high gearing ratios are only possible because the 
conglomerates themselves are considered by the state as “too big too fail” and 
so do not have to bear the cost of financial distress.  However, this overlooks 
the mechanism by which discipline was instilled in the system.  A failing 
conglomerate in Korea was not simply dissolved through the market (which 
might not place a value on the firm) but was rather taken over by another 
conglomerate. The conglomerate thus ceased to have an independent existence 
and the managers who ran it were dismissed. Again, in markets which are 
incomplete such a mechanism is efficient and reduces the losses associated with 
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completely dissolving the conglomerate.  These countries have maintained high 
growth rates despite such supposedly “inefficient” practices.  In the wake of the 
Asian crisis there has been a chorus of calls for the establishment of an effective 
bankruptcy code in these countries.  Given that capital account liberalisation has 
increased the presence of foreign banks and investors in Asian corporations, 
such a development is probably necessary. However, it does not answer the 
important question of which bankruptcy code to establish. Bankruptcy codes are 
very different throughout the OECD and developing countries will have to 
examine them closely to see which one is most effective in their individual 
circumstances. 
 
However, high gearing ratios entail both benefits and costs for the firm.  High 
ratios, as noted above, can help alleviate the agency problem that exists between 
owners and managers by compelling the latter to work harder to improve 
profitability and productivity.  Furthermore, high gearing ratios also allow 
families that are reluctant to issue new equity to retain control of companies. 
Under normal circumstances, high gearing ratios do not present many problems 
since short-term debt is almost always rolled over, making it the functional 
equivalent of long-term debt.  However, as the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 
demonstrated, high levels of debt can also be a source of vulnerability, 
especially if it has a short maturity structure and is denominated in foreign 
currency.  In principle, this problem should be attenuated if the debt is 
contracted in local currency because the central bank can expand the money 
supply to reduce the real financing burden of the corporate sector.    
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VII.  Conglomerates and Economic Efficiency 
Another issue closely connected with corporate governance and corporate 
finance in emerging markets is that of large family-owned conglomerates – an 
organisational form which is ubiquitous in the developing world.  These have 
been blamed for the Asian crisis because of their lack of transparency, poor 
corporate governance, and inadequate accounting procedures and for not being 
focused.  The owners are thought to be more interested in empire building than 
in pursuing share-holder value.  It is also suggested that the giant third world 
conglomerates, or the business groups, are regarded by the governments as 
being ‘too big to fail’, leading to moral hazard. The high gearing ratios of 
developing country conglomerates, such as those in Korea, are thought to reflect 
the cronyistic relationship between corporations, banks and the government. 
The business groups often have an in-house banks which it is alleged are used 
by the controlling families to undertake risky debt financed projects, or to create 
over-capacity.   
 
This is however a partial, one-sided picture of Business Groups in developing 
countries that ignores the most recent theoretical and empirical research on the 
subject.  It also overlooks the salient point that such firms have been playing the 
leading role in emerging markets in all continents notwithstanding the 
differences in institutional structures, cultures and government economic 
policies. Economic policy towards developing country conglomerates needs to 
be based on a full comprehension of their specificity rather than simply 
applying the lessons of diversified firms in the U.K. and the U.S.   
 
The other side of the story is provided by Amsden (1989 and 2000), in a series 
of papers by Khanna and Palepu (notably 1997, 1999), and Khanna and Yafeh 
(2000) as well as the earlier work of other scholars (see for example Leff, 1978, 
1979).  These scholars point out important differences between the third world 
conglomerates and their western counterparts.  The latter, particularly in the 
U.S., were products of the huge takeover movements of the 1960s.  At that time, 
the Anglo-Saxon stock markets convinced themselves that conglomerates added 
value: they became the glamour stocks of the period.  However, the subsequent 
lacklustre performance of conglomerate firms led by the mid-1980s to stock 
market opinion moving decisively against these diversified firms. The same 
market professionals and investment banks who made money on assembling 
these conglomerates in the 1960s through the takeover process now profited 
from dissembling these through the same process – what Scherer (1988) called 
the “bustup” takeovers.  Ignoring the social cost of these obvious mistakes of 
the stock markets,9 the significant point is that developing country 
conglomerates are a different breed: they are normally not products of takeovers 
but in fact have usually grown and diversified organically.  Many of them are, 
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however, engaged in such a wide variety of products and industries, with no 
apparent technological connections between them, that they have been rightly 
called idiosyncratic conglomerates.10  Historically, there were diversified firms 
in today’s advanced countries as well during the course of their economic 
development.  However, this diversification was usually limited to the 
technologically closely related industries (Chandler, 1977, and Amsden and 
Hikino, 1994).  The emerging market conglomerates are diversified far beyond 
such technological linkages. 
 
Alice Amsden (1989, 2000) regards Korean chaebols as the engines of Korea’s 
industrial development and of its enormous success in international markets.  
Khanna and Palepu in their papers cited earlier provide the theoretical rationale 
as to why these big business groups maybe more successful in emerging 
markets than in developed countries. Their argument is straightforward. 
Developing countries suffer from a large number of market deficiencies. They 
have incomplete or missing product markets, as well as those for labour and 
capital, far more so than would be the case in advanced countries.  In addition, 
emerging markets do not yet have the whole gamut of information gathering 
and disseminating private organisations, regulatory institutions, professional 
bodies, all of which constitute the economic, social and legal institutional 
framework within which advanced country markets are embedded. In the 
absence of such a framework in emerging markets, conglomerate firms help fill 
this institutional void. To illustrate, in the absence of trained managers and 
training institutions for such managers, Business Groups would often have in-
house training centres for the Group managers. Tata, for example, in India has a 
world class training program for all their Group managers. Similarly, in view of 
the many imperfections of developing country capital markets, it is more 
efficient for the Business Group central office to allocate capital directly 
through an appropriate internal allocative mechanism. Williamson (1975) is the 
classic reference on this subject. 
 
In relation to international trade, developing country corporations are at a 
serious competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis those from advanced countries. The 
latter have well-established brand names, huge advertising budgets which 
constitute enormous barriers to entry for developing country firms.  The 
Business Group gives these firms an institutional means of at least partially 
overcoming this handicap. Instead of promoting brand names for particular 
products as advanced countries corporations do, those in emerging markets 
attempt to build the image and reputation for high quality of the Business Group 
as a whole. Thus, the Samsung and Hyundai groups are promoted -  rather than 
single product lines - as a strategic response to the market disadvantages which 
individual or unaffiliated developing country firms face. This has arguably been 
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a major factor in the success of large Korean conglomerates in the international 
market place. The result is that by 1990, 11 Korean firms were represented in 
the Fortune magazine ranking of the world’s top five hundred corporations, the 
same number as Switzerland.  Twenty years earlier, there was not a single 
Korean company in the top five hundred.11
 
Amsden and Hikino (1994) put forward a different kind of argument to explain 
the existence and the efficiency of privately owned Business Groups in late 
industrialising countries. They suggest that in these countries Business Group 
managers become adept at choosing, purchasing and adapting relevant 
technologies from abroad. This kind of expertise Amsden and Hikino suggest is 
not industry specific and can be used in many different industries. Support for 
this hypothesis is provided by the Management Agency System, which 
prevailed in India for almost a hundred years. Under this system, teams 
specialising in modern management would offer to run firms on modern lines in 
different industries for a management fee.  The system was ultimately abolished 
in India after independence, not on grounds of inefficiency, but rather on 
grounds of equity – the system was held to promote monopoly power and was at 
variance with India’s “socialistic” pattern of development.  Many of the leading 
present day Indian Business Groups are direct descendants of the Management 
Agency System. 
 
There are thus powerful analytical arguments for the existence, survival and 
efficiency of Business groups in developing countries. In the absence of 
appropriate institution and markets which have taken a long time to develop, the 
dominant Anglo-Saxon strategies of “core competence” and “focus” are 
unlikely to be suitable for Business Groups in emerging markets. 
 
Empirical evidence 
Turning now to empirical evidence, how do developing country Business 
Groups perform relative to unaffiliated firms? Are they so idiosyncratically 
diversified that despite the reasons outlined above they are nevertheless 
inefficient and need to be down-sized or abolished altogether?  Some empirical 
research on this issue is summarised in Table 8.  The table comes from Khanna 
and Yafeh’s (2000) careful and painstaking study of Business Groups from 15 
emerging markets. As the definition of what constitutes a Business Group 
differs between countries in this research it is defined on the basis of local 
expert knowledge in each country.12  The table pertains to various periods in the 
1980s and 1990s.  It indicates that in 9 out of 15 emerging markets, the average 
rate of return of the group-affiliated firms was greater than that of the 
unaffiliated firms.  In 8 out of 15 emerging markets, the average standard 
deviation of the rate of return of the affiliated groups is smaller than that of their 
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unaffiliated counterparts. Khanna and Yafeh  conclude from the latter evidence 
that the “provision of risk sharing, to compensate for under-developed capital 
markets, is probably not the most important reason for the ubiquity of business 
groups around the world.”  
 
Khanna (2000) provides an overall review of the empirical studies on the 
efficiency of Business Groups.  He concludes:  
 
…the existing evidence suggests that the performance effects of group 
affiliation are large and generally positive.  There is substantial evidence 
that part of this is due to welfare-enhancing functions originating in the 
idea that groups substitute for missing outside institutions, but that part is 
also due to welfare-reducing minority shareholder exploitation.  (p.748) 
 
The last clause in Khanna’s conclusion suggests that there are also negative 
effects of Business Groups.  Specifically, the Groups are known to exploit the 
minority shareholders in the Group companies (see further Claessens et al., 
1999 and Johnson et al., 2000).  However, notwithstanding anecdotal evidence 
about rent-seeking and monopolistic behaviour of Business Groups, there is 
very little systematic empirical evidence on this subject.   
 
Policy Issues: The Chaebol Reform in Korea 
The most important and immediate policy issues with respect to the Business 
Groups in emerging markets arise in relation to the chaebol conglomerates in 
Korea. Chaebol reform constituted an important element in the IMF 
conditionality for Korea following the financial crisis on 1997-98.  Reforms 
involved improvements in corporate governance, greater focus, reducing the 
level of diversification and reductions in the debt/equity ratio.  This was 
envisaged to be a part of the structural reform of the corporate sector from close 
relationships between the government, business and the banks to an arm’s 
length relationship between the three entities.  After initial hesitation, the new 
Kim Dae Jung government evidently supported these reforms (Krause, 2000).   
 
The most serious economic criticism of the chaebol was that they had invested 
recklessly in unprofitable projects on borrowed money. It is indeed true that the 
top chaebol had, at the time of the crisis, high debt/equity ratios (see Table 9).  
The top five chaebols had an average debt/equity ratio of 458% in 1997.  Under 
the government’s reorganisation plan, imposed on the chaebol, they were 
supposed to reduce these ratios to 200% by the end of 1999.  
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Country Year No. of firms No.of group 
affiliated firms
(Median size of 
group affiliated 
firms)/(Median 
size of un-
affiliated firms)
Median of ROA 
of group 
affliated firms 
(%)
Median of ROA 
of unaffliated 
firms (%)
Median stadard 
deviation of 
ROA, group 
affiliated firms 
(%)
Median stadard 
deviation of 
ROA,  
unaffiliated 
firms (%)
Argentina 90-97 25 11 5.53 3.95 7.78** 3.67 4.91**
Brazil 90-97 108 51 2.50 3.3 1.85** 4.05 5.07
Chile 89-96 225 50 18.71 5.93 2.2* 4.42 4.10
Colobia 88-97 16 7 4.54 1.43 0.90 7.40 9.02
India 90-97 5446 1821 4.37 11.73 9.56* 4.65 4.37*
Indonesia 93-95 236 153 2.79 7.31 7.81 1.93 2.53*
Israel 93-95 183 43 4.99 5.6 3.90 4.40 6.80
Korea 91-95 427 218 3.63 4.85 5.12 1.88 2.58*
Mexico 88-97 55 19 2.29 8.22 6.08 4.89 4.92
Peru 88-97 21 5 1.62 7.92 7.86 10.51 9.98
Philippines 92-97 148 37 3.43 7.32 3.98 2.48 2.95
Taiwan 90-97 178 79 2.05 5.07 6.22 1.75 2.26**
Thailand 92-97 415 258 2.33 2.9 4.41* 4.32 4.93**
Turkey 88-97 40 21 0.96 24.62 26.32 12.52 12.37
Venezuela 88-97 11 2 1.45 3.68 4.60 6.11 3.9*
Pre-war Japan 32-43 58 17 6.80 5.5 6.40 4.40 7.10
Post-war Japan 77-92 1002 94 8.50 3.41 3.63 2.23 2.29
Firm numbers, as well as statistics on firm size (total assets) and median return on ssets (ROA) are all based on the year for which we have maximal coverage 
for the country in question.  Firms with profit rates above 100 percent or below -100 percent are excluded from the analysis.  In pre-was Japan
group affliation refers to affliation in the largest three zaibatzu only.  In post-war Japan, group members are defined as members of Presidents' Club only.  
Significance levels for the comparisons of medians are based on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. * denotes significance at 5 percent level and **denotes 
significance at 10 percent level.
Table 8. Group affiliation around the world
Note: The table shows summary statistics on group risk and operating performance for fifteen emerging markets as well as for pre-and post-was Japan.  
 34
 
Table 9.  Debt-equity ratios of Korean Chaebols (million won)
Company Total Assets Debt Debt/equity ratio 
Samsung 50856.4 37043.6 268.2
Hyundai 53183.7 43319.3 439.1
Daewoo 34205.6 26383.2 337.3
Lucky-Goldstar 37068.4 28765.6 346.5
Hanjin 13904.5 11787.7 556.9
Kia 14161.9 11890.9 523.6
Ssanyong 15807.2 12701.4 409.0
Sunkyong 22726.6 18040.3 385.0
Hanwha 10967.7 9718.8 778.2
Daelim 5793.3 4586.5 380.1
Kumho 7398.0 6117.9 477.9
Doosan 6402.0 5594.0 692.3
Halla 6626.5 6320.8 2067.6
Sammi 2515.4 2593.3 3329.0
Hyosung 4124.4 3252.8 373.2
Hanil 2628.1 2231.8 563.2
Dong-Ah Construction 6287.9 4905.8 355.0
Kohap 3653.6 3123.6 589.4
Jinro 3940.5 3865.2 8598.7
Dongkuk Steel 3697.5 2536.4 218.4
Source: Finance Times, August 8, 1997 reproduced in Singh 1998b.
 
It will be appreciated in the light of the theoretical and empirical discussions 
above that the case for such reforms on grounds of economic efficiency are 
rather thin.  As Khanna and Palepu (1999) note, abolishing or restricting the 
chaebol may be inefficient in the absence of a range of market institutions that 
will take time to develop.  There is also no reason to believe that the optimal 
debt/equity ratio for the top five chaebols is necessarily 200%, rather than any 
other arbitrary number.   Other countries with different financial systems than 
those of the U.K. and the US also have high debt/equity ratios, for example, 
Norway (500-538%), Sweden (555%) and Finland (492%).  In Japan the 
debt/equity ratio in 1991 was measured at 369%, while in France and Italy it 
measured 361% and 307% respectively.  Moreover, there is reason to believe 
that the debt/equity ratios of US corporations are rising as they are buying up 
their own equity by borrowing money (Economist, Jan.22-Feb.2, 2001, Survey 
of Corporate Finance). 
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However, as Singh (1998b) notes, the more significant point in relation to the 
high debt/equity ratios of Korean chaebol is that these corporate financial 
arrangements were functional within the traditional Korean system.  These 
arrangements were particularly useful during Korea’s industrialisation drive, as 
the corporations were induced by the government to enter into new 
technological areas involving huge risks.  Left to themselves, the corporations 
may not have been able to undertake such risks, but with the government 
becoming in effect a co-partner through the banking system, such technological 
risks were effectively “socialised”.  However, this system became dysfunctional 
when the government introduced financial liberalisation and abolished 
economic planning in the early 1990s in preparation for its membership in the 
OECD.  By permitting Korean companies and banks to raise money abroad 
without the traditional supervision and control, the authorities were unable to 
control – or even monitor – the rapid accumulation of short-term, foreign 
currency denominated debt.  In this connection, it is interesting to note the case 
of India, since Business Groups there are also highly geared.  However, despite 
the fact that the country’s fundamentals were, if anything, weaker than those in 
Korea, a crisis did not develop because the government maintained strict 
controls on the foreign-currency exposure of the private sector.  Thus, India’s 
very limited and deliberate moves towards some capital account convertibility 
have not increased the vulnerability of the rupee to sudden shifts in investor 
sentiment and to speculative attacks.             
 
There is very little empirical evidence in support of the view that Business 
Groups in developing countries must be drastically reformed or even abolished.  
However, there remains theoretical and empirical support for the view that large 
Business Groups play a key role in late industrialisation by compensating for 
structural gaps in developing country capital, product and labour markets.  
Given the paucity of evidence and studies in this area, it is appropriate to adopt 
a more cautious stance with regard to these groups than the current orthodox 
policy consensus allows.  As Khanna (2000) notes in the conclusion to his 
study: “What seems clear is that an extreme characterization of groups as purely 
socially harmful or purely socially welfare enhancing appears unsupported by 
the evidence (p.756).”   
 
It is also pertinent to point out that the charge that Business Groups are large 
bureaucratic organisations that thwart innovation and small firm entry is not 
supported by analysis and evidence.  On the contrary, Khanna and Palepu 
(1999) note that in the absence of specialised venture capital firms, the Business 
Groups in emerging markets help fill this institutional gap.  Evidence from India 
– a successful IT country – suggests that the top 25 Indian exporters and 
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producers of IT were mostly off-shoots of big Business Groups (Singh, Singh 
and Weisse, 2000). 
    
In relation to the reform of corporate governance, the international finance 
institutions view is to restructure the chaebol towards maximizing shareholder 
value, giving greater power to minority shareholders, increasing the 
representation of non-executive directors on the board – in other words, to look 
and act more like Anglo-Saxon firms.  However, Singh (1999) and Chang and 
Park (2000) have argued that this is not the most desirable reform agenda, let 
alone the only possible one.  An alternative strategy has been proposed by Singh 
(1998b). This envisages reforming the relationship between government and, 
business by making it more inclusive and extending it to other social sectors, 
particularly labour and civil society. Very briefly, one way of doing this may be 
to establish the German type system of corporate governance with two-tier 
boards where management, labour and, in the Korean case, the government 
would be closely involved in all major decisions of the corporation. Such co-
operative relationships with respect to the governance of corporations and the 
society at large are more likely to help in the current crisis than arm’s length 
relationships between government, business and labour. This is because the 
former are more in accord with the Korean traditions and customs and their 
preferences for co-operative social relationships. Structures based on arm-length 
relationships have a tendency to degenerate into adversarial relations during 
times of crisis that can make the desired economic and social changes more 
difficult to achieve. 
 
Finally, it is important to observe that in the Korean context it is not just the 
economics of the chaebol’s crisis and reform that are relevant but also evidently  
their politics. Leading chaebols are regarded by many people as being 
implicated in the repression during the period of military rule. If so, it is 
necessary to make a distinction between the owners of the particular chaebol 
who were involved in repression and the chaebol as an organisation form.13 
Proceedings should be taken against the Chaebol owners for their misdeeds 
rather than punish or abolish the Chaebol themselves. For the reasons given 
above the latter have still a great deal to contribute to Korea’s economic 
development. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
 
 
To sum up, this paper has argued that there is a diversity of corporate 
governance systems that have proved effective in different national contexts.  
The continental Europeans and the Japanese have prospered with alternative 
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corporate governance systems that have given a larger voice to stakeholders in 
the firm and have afforded relatively less protection to outside investors.   The 
system of corporate governance in the US and the U.K. is clearly not the only 
way to effectively and efficiently run the corporate economy and, indeed, for 
developing countries it is far from being the best way.  Its reliance on the stock 
market and consequently on that market’s pricing process and takeover 
mechanism creates perverse incentives that can undermine long-term growth by 
accentuating the influence of short-term considerations.   
 
In place of a drive by international organizations to promote the Anglo-Saxon 
system of corporate governance around the world, what is needed is a genuine 
recognition that there are many competing systems of corporate governance and 
it must be left to developing countries to decide which one is optimal for their 
particular circumstances.  Above all, what is required is an analysis of corporate 
governance structures underpinned by a solid factual understanding of these 
systems in economic development.  It must be free of the ideology and 
prejudice that reflexively argues that conglomerates are bad, and that any 
corporate governance system other than the Anglo-Saxon model is intrinsically 
flawed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
 
1 This paper is based on Singh, Singh and Weisse (2003), and the author is 
grateful to UNCTAD for  permission to use material from that paper for this 
article. 
2 Note that control is defined as a 20% or higher share of equity.  
3 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000. 
4 For a comparison of growth rates in advanced economies, see Maddison 
(1991).  The comparison above was based on Table 3.1 on p.49.  French 
growth over the period 1870-1989 was 1.8% (annual average compound 
growth rate), which compares favourably with the U.K. (1.4%) and the 
US (1.8%). The argument in the text applies only to the LLSV thesis in 
its strong ahistorical form.  The thesis can be expressed in a weaker 
version which would state that the Anglo-Saxon form of corporate 
governance is most conducive to growth under certain historical 
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circumstances, but not in others.  However, LLSV do not explicitly make 
any such historical distinction.  
5 For a fuller discussion of these measurement biases see Whittington, Saporta 
and Singh (1997). 
6 For recent modern treatments of the subject see Allen and Gale (2001), and 
Schiller (2000) 
7 See collection of studies in Porter (1992). 
8  Of course, there is also a positive feedback loop between the two markets, 
with higher stock market valuations leading to capital inflows and an 
appreciating exchange rate.  It is thus possible that a stock market bubble 
will lead to an overvalued real exchange rate that in turn affects the 
competitiveness of the tradeable sector. 
9 See further Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) on this point. 
10 This is Guy Pfefferman’s phrase. See Singh (1995a). 
11 See further Amsden and Hikino (1994), Singh (1995b) 
12 In some countries, Business Groups are organised along the lines of holding 
companies, i.e., the leading company either directly or through 
pyramiding holds a controlling equity stake in the affiliated company.   In 
other countries, the affiliated companies are not bound by large equity 
stakes, but more by social ties, ethnic origin or firm history (such as the 
Japanese keiretsu).  For a fuller discussion, see Khanna (2000). 
 
 
13 I am grateful to Professor J. Crotty for this point 
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